INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the stability of rational expectations equilibria (REE) in a model with Bayesian agents who initially possess a correct specification of the underlying structure of the economy but are uncertain of the values of some parameters. This can be an extraordinarily complicated problem because of an infinite regress in expectations. In making their optimizing decisions, agents must consider not only their own beliefs regarding parameter values, but also the beliefs of other agents, the beliefs of other agents regarding other agents' beliefs, etc. The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that in a specific partial equilibrium setting adapted from Townsend [1978] there is convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium in spite of the initial heterogeneity of beliefs.
The topic of convergence to rational expectations has recently been the focus of considerable attention (for a survey of the literature see Blume, Bray, and Easley [1982] ). The papers in the literature can be characterized according to whether the learning mechanism of agents is Bayesian or "boundedly rational' .2 In a Bayesian model, agents are Bayesian decision makers whose prior beliefs are consistent with the underlying structure of the world they inhabit. The Bayesian paradigm implicitly assumes that agents are able to discern the (possibly stochastic) functional relationship between parameter values and equilibrium outcomes. If in the original model agents don't "know" the rational expectations equilibrium it is because they are uncertain of the prameter values. Inevitably, the Bayesian "solution" entails augmenting the probability space by embedding within it all conceivable parameter values, so a state of the world includes a specification of the realization of all parameter values, and imposing the rational expectations equilibrium concept for the augmented model.
In the boundedly rational-models of learning, agents are typically portrayed as * Manuscript received July, 1985; revised January, 1987. 1 I am indebted to Christian Gilles, Jack Marshall, Jon Sonstelie and especially two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. I also wish to acknowledge beneficial conversations David Easley, James Jordan, and Chris Sims. It should not be inferred that the above individuals share the opinions expressed in this paper and of course only I am responsible for any errors.
2 Recent papers that adopt a Bayesian approach are Blume-Easley [1984] and Feldman [1986] , while Jordan [1985, 1986] , Marcet-Sargent [1986] and Woodford [1986] are boundedly rational models of learning. 635 classical or Bayesian statisticians who erroneously perceive themselves as being in a stationary environment. But because of the feedback effects induced by changing beliefs, the sequence of equilibrium outcomes in learning models is a non-stationary stochastic process. Possible interpretations of boundedly rational behavior are: (1) each agent naively assumes that no other agents are engaged in learning estimation, or (2) agents do not recognize (or consider to be negligible) the dynamic impact of aggregate learning.
The equivalence of the modern neoclassical theory of von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility maximization with the Bayesian paradigm (for a discussion, see Arrow [1970] ) provides strong justification for analyzing intertemporal learning in an explicitly Bayesian framework. The alternative approach of assuming bounded rationality has been justified on grounds of the plausibility or reasonableness of the specific forecasting scheme. (For instance, see Bray [1982] , Blume-Easley [1982] , DeCanio [1979] , and Marcet-Sargent [1986] .) It has been emphasized (especially by Bray-Kreps [1981] ) that in contrast the sophistication and computational skill required of agents in correctly specified Bayesian models is beyond human capability.
While this argument is not without merit, many of the boundedly rational models provide an incomplete framework to address the asymptotic issue of whether or not there is convergence to a stationary rational expectations equilibrium. Typically these models yield convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium for a set of parameter values, the "stable set", but there is also a non-negligible complement in the parameter space for which with positive probability there is either no limit stochastic process or else the limit is not a rational expectations equilibrium. When convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium does not occur, the limiting behavior of agents is implausible. They continue to abide by their forecasting scheme despite overwhelming statistical evidence of model misspecification. The robustness of rational expectations as a long-run equilibrium concept cannot be challenged by such a scenario. In practice, agents would ultimately revise their model rather than persisting with an estimation procedure evidently flawed.
Jordan [1985] has a general equilibrium model with non-Bayesian learning which is exempt from the above criticism, in that there is a.s. convergence to a REE for all parameter values. But to guarantee the existence of a temporary equilibrium, Jordan assumes that within each period there is learning in "virtual" time. Agents acquire information despite the absence of any genuine economic activity. The within period learning can be interpreted as an informational tatonnemont process. Since individuals may acquire more information from this process than could be inferred from the equilibrium price, this modeling strategy may exaggerate the information transmitted via the market mechanism.
In much recent work, especially in macroeconomics, the economy is modeled as a stationary REE. A distinct issue from how best to model how agents "actually learn" is whether the stationary REE can be embedded in an internally consistent theory of decision making when we allow individuals to be initially uninformed regarding parameter values that they know in the REE. A frequent defense of the REE concept is the assertion that rational agents will make optimal use of all available information, i.e., they will act as Bayesian decision makers. Often, there is an auxiliary, albeit tacit, assumption that a consequence of such behavior is convergence to a stationary REE. But what if this conjecture of convergence is false? This would place those who advocate the stationary REE as the appropriate long-run equilibrium concept in the peculiar position of having to reject Bayesian theories of learning while simultaneously endorsing models in which agents rigorously adhere to the tenets of Bayesian decision theory. The usual normative arguments advanced to support the stationary REE as an equilibium hypothesis are not compelling without demonstration that such an equilibrium will be attained as the limit of a Bayesian learning scheme.
An important but unresolved issue in analyzing learning is whether the estimation scheme in Jordan [1985] , or in other models with bounded rationality, has a superior claim to plausibility or reasonableness than the Bayesian methodology. Until now, all of the positive results in the boundedly rational learning literature rely upon an extreme degree of coordination in agents' forecasting strategies. Jordan The model used in this paper is essentially that in Townsend [1978] . Townsend [1978] is a model with a continuum of producers with quadratic cost functions facing a linear stochastic demand function with a parameter 0 which is not only unknown, but also the beliefs of others firms regarding 0 are unknown. Townsend (section V) succeeds in deriving closed form solutions for the infinite order beliefs of agents for each time period. He conjectures, but is unable to prove, that beliefs of all orders converge to some limit that induces convergence to a REE. The principal result of this paper is that Townsend's conjecture is correct; beliefs of all orders do converge and in the limit rational expectations prevails.
The uncertainty agents have regarding 0 is treated in this paper in accordance with the approach to games of incomplete information advocated by Harsanyi [1967, 1968] . Bray and Kreps [1981] and Blume and Easley [1984] have previously adopted this framework for modeling the behavior of agents with heterogeneous information. Similarly, the asymptotic convergence results in these two papers and my paper are in large measure consequences of the Martingale Convergence Theorem. In contrast to the model in this paper, the BlumeEasley model has the merit of being embedded in a general equilibrium framework. But to achieve this generality they are forced to assume: (1) that the parameter space 0 of possible probability laws governing the economy is finite, and (2) the period t behavior of an initially uninformed trader depends solely upon current characteristics (endowment and preferences) and their beginning-of-period t probability measure on o. 3 No such assumptions are needed in this paper. The remainder of the paper is oiganized as follows. Section 2 consists of a formal description of the model. Existence of an equilibrium and convergence in L1 to the REE are proven in Section 3. A sufficient condition to prove a.s. convergence and characterize the equilibrium as a function of beliefs regarding 0 is provided in Section 4. Section 5 contains conclusions and remarks regarding possible generalizations. for i E AS. The probability space on which all random variables are defined is (Q, Y, P). The prior probability P is shared by all firms. As in the seminal paper of Harsanyi [1967, 1968] , the viewpoint here is that any divergence in beliefs among firms arises from them receiving different information. The information available to a type s firm prior to period t is represented by the sub-a-field 3S,twhere t E T= {1, 2,...). The collective information available prior to period t is YL = I VysS,t-l1 s=l The firms produce a homogeneous product for which the period t per firm demand function is Dt(pt) = -bpt+ 0+t.
DESCRIPTION OF THE
The price coefficient b is a parameter, in the sense that its value does not depend upon the realization of co E Q. 0 is the exogenous random variable in the model for which firms may have asymmetric initial information. It is the possiblity that P(0e AllFs,O) # P(0 eAll;v,O) for an arbitrary Borel set A, that induces the intricacy of the learning process. Initially the only assumption made with regard to 0 is that 0 is strictly positive and integrable. This is sufficient to prove that outputs of firms converge in L1 to the REE outputs. Further restrictions made in Section 4 yield a proof of a.s. convergence and allow a simple characterization of output as a function of beliefs.
The sequence of random variables {;t}jtr is i.i.d. with mean zero. Also, the the sequence {fe} is independent of 0 and the sub-a-field F&L.
The output of firm i in period t is qit which is a random variable since it is chosen in accordance with firm i's expectation at time t-1 of Pt, the period t price which is also a random variable. The realization of qit is denoted by qi, 
FORMATION oF PRICE EXPECTATIONS
The first task in determining the evolution of prices and outputs over time is to define a temporary rational expectations equilibrium (TREE), the equilibrium concept that is assumed to describe the behavior of firms at a given point in time. 
Definition. A period t TREE is

iii) FS, t = -Ss, t-1 v a(-Pt) I iv) for all u E L, for almost all (), t(o)) = Max {O, aE[Pftjj 94,t-1] (c))} = Max {O, a [E(O 11 97,t-1) (c))-E(Z Y As4 11 X 9,Wt-1 (c))
Firms observe the realization of Pt but no other aggregate market data. In particular, Qt(w-)) is not revealed to the firms. The formal statement of the revision of beliefs that occurs upon observing Pt()) = Pt is that 7s,t = 9s,t 1voa(Pt) for all s E L.5 Upon determining the posterior beliefs, firms can choose period t 1 outputs, etc.
Before plunging into the technical details of proving existence of an equilibrium and limit theorems, as an aid to the reader the basic conceptual ideas will first be sketched. The first step to define a space Y* of information structures exploiting mathematical results introduced into the economics literature by Allen [1983] For s E L, define 9s ** to be the family of all sub-o-fields of S. Define an equivalence relation on s, ** by Y' 9" if for every G e 9, there exists G'e9' such that P(GzG')=O (and vice versa). Define Ys' * to be the family of equivalence classes of .s,**. Before endowing .s,* with a topology we need 5 All the results of this paper extend to the case where firms receive information in addition to that generated by prices. As long as ( 1Va(P))css, for all s and t, none of the proofs require modification. functions is 4, =E(,o), Y1 is defined by . =(s0, , VP1, Y0, 2VPI The last equality and ju < a imply that 
